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RISKY VENTURES: THE IMPACT OF IRS
HEALTH CARE JOINT VENTURE POLICY
Roger P. Meyers*
IRS oversight of joint ventures between exempt and for-profit organizations has
undergone substantial change over the past thirty years. This change has impor-
tant consequences for the health care industry, where joint ventures have grown
increasingly common. In the face of unclear guidance and aggressive enforcement
of exemption-policing tools such as the private benefit doctrine and the control test,
a hospital risks revocation of its tax-exempt status, or liability for unrelated busi-
ness income tax, when it engages in a joint venture directly. It may be able to
eliminate this risk by operating the same joint venture through a for-profit subsidi-
ary; however, such a structure may be less constrained to serve a charitable
mission. Thus, the Service's approach to policing tax-exempt status creates incen-
tives to structure joint ventures in a way that may ultimately reduce charitable
care. This Note argues that such incentives are undesirable and avoidable, and
proposes several reforms that would help to eliminate them.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty years, regulation of joint ventures' between
non-profit hospitals and for-profit entities has changed substan-
tially. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service") has shifted
from a per se prohibition of these ventures to a case-by-case test that
evaluates individual facts and circumstances.3 But in 1991, the IRS
* University of Michigan Law School,J.D. expected 2009; Suffolk University, B.S.B.A.
2003. I would like to thank Professor Jill Horwitz for providing me with the critical ground-
ing in health and non-profit law and policy required to develop this Note, and my mother
for diving into unfamiliar legal and tax concepts to help edit it. I owe a special debt of grati-
tude to my wife Kathleen, whose many sacrifices have made my academic career possible,
and to my son Caden, who simply thinks Daddy reads a lot.
1. This Note uses certain simplifications to ease readability. Strictly speaking, "non-
profit" and "tax-exempt" are not synonymous, though they are closely related. An entity can
organize under state law as operating not-for-profit yet not seek or not qualify for
tax-exemption. The inverse is not true due to the "non-distribution constraint" that the
prohibition on private inurement imposes. I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (2006). 1 will generally use
"non-profit" as a synonym for "tax-exempt" throughout this Note since it contrasts more
crisply with the for-profit form. Similarly, the phrase "joint ventures" as used herein refers
exclusively to commercial partnerships between non-profit entities-hospitals specifically-
and for-profit entities. It is quite possible for two or more non-profit entities to engage in a
joint venture, and even more common to find joint ventures formed by only for-profit part-
ners, but these structures typically do not raise the risks addressed by this Note.
2. This phrase broadly includes corporations, partnerships and LLCs, as well as indi-
vidual physicians.
3. See infra Part I.A.1.
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issued a landmark General Counsel Memorandum4 ("GCM") sig-
naling a shift back toward increasingly restrictive oversight of these
joint ventures.5 A series of revenue rulings and cases following
GCM 39,862 firmly established a control test that places strict limi-
tations on the division of ownership, management structure, and
charitable obligations ofjoint ventures.
The IRS has not been making policy in a vacuum-the use of
joint ventures in the health care industry has undergone explosive
growth over this same period.7 Hospitals are responding to both
competitive threats and financial opportunities by using joint ven-
tures.8 Under current federal tax law, hospitals can choose between
several joint venture structures. 9 Historically, the risk/benefit bal-
ance between these structures has favored direct partnerships
between non-profit hospitals and for-profit entities. However, as
the framework for evaluating these ventures has become more re-
strictive, directjoint ventures increasingly risk imposing tax liability
on the hospital partner and even jeopardizing its exempt status."
In contrast, by operating the joint venture through a for-profit sub-
sidiary, a hospital can eliminate these risks and gain significant
business flexibility."
The implications of these altered incentives may be significant.
When a non-profit hospital engages in a direct joint venture, it
generally takes great care to ensure that the activities of the ven-
ture further its charitable mission. 2 In contrast, subsidiary joint
ventures are far less constrained in their operations. 3 If hospitals
respond to these altered incentives by choosing to use subsidiary
joint ventures instead of direct joint ventures, it is likely that the
ventures will deliver less benefit to the community. 4 Perversely,
4. General Counsel Memoranda are drafted by the IRS Office of Chief Counsel and
provide legal analysis of proposed Revenue Rulings, Private Letter Rulings, and Technical
Advice Memoranda. They are non-precedential, but they may convey valuable insight into
the IRS perspective on taxation issues. See MICHELE LAFoREST HALLORAN & ANDREW S.
CAMPBELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO TAX-RELATED LEGAL RESEARCH 9 (2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax-relatedjlegalresearch 121106.pdf.
5. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mere. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). This GCM applied the newly in-
vigorated private benefit doctrine to criticize and recommend revocation of three previously
issued Private Letter Rulings that had approved health care joint ventures. See discussion
infra Part II.A.1 (detailing circumstances leading up to the GCM and their significance).
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part I.A.2.
8. See infra Part I.A.2.
9. See infra Part I.B.3.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part III A.
12. See infra Parts I.B.2-3.
13. See infra Parts I.B.3, III.A.
14. See infra Part III.A.
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policies intended to protect the integrity of the charitable exemp-
tion system may actually decrease charitable health care overall.
Such a result is not only senseless, but also unnecessary. This Note
argues that by using existing enforcement tools more consistently
and predictably, and by clarifying the control test and applying it in
a rigorous fashion, the IRS can continue to police the exemption
system without creating these detrimental incentives.
1 5
Part I of this Note explains the background of joint ventures in
health care and their evolution from prohibition to virtual neces-
sity. It also provides a short overview of the requirements for
exempt status and identifies the structures by which a non-profit
hospital can engage in a joint venture. Part II examines the policy
shifts leading to significantly more restrictive regulation of joint
ventures, and evaluates the substantial risks that a hospital now
faces when entering into a direct joint venture. Part III shows that
these risks, as well as the business problems created by the attempt
to mitigate them, make the use of a for-profit subsidiary compara-
tively appealing, and argues that this has negative societal
consequences. Finally, Part III concludes with a discussion of policy
refinements that the IRS should employ to eliminate the regula-
tory incentives that make the use of a for-profit subsidiary desirable
in circumstances where a direct joint venture could better serve
the public.
I. JOINT VENTURES HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY
COMMON IN HEALTH CARE
The use of joint ventures in health care has changed dramati-
cally over the past thirty years. Part I.A reviews the watershed
Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v. Commissioner6 decision that forced
the IRS to change its policy and permit joint ventures between
non-profit and for-profit entities. It continues by discussing the
economic considerations that have made joint ventures particularly
appealing in health care. Part I.B discusses the basic requirements
for obtaining tax exemption and the particular standards hospitals
must meet for the IRS to recognize them as charitable. It con-
cludes with an explanation of the organizational structures by
which a joint venture may be undertaken. This overview will pro-
vide the necessary background to the discussion in Parts II and III
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), affdper curiam, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
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that explains how current IRS policy makes direct joint ventures
more risky and evaluates the impact this policy has on choice of
organizational structure.
A. From Total Ban to Business as Usual
In his authoritative text, Michael Sanders has defined a joint
venture as "an association of persons or entities jointly undertaking
a particular transaction for mutual profit."1 7 It is of little wonder,
then, that the IRS essentially maintained a per se ban on the par-
ticipation of a tax-exempt organization as a general partner in a
joint venture until the early 1980s.1 However, as this absolute pro-
hibition fell by the wayside, hospitals moved quickly to take
advantage of the newfound opportunities and have since become
frequent participants in joint ventures.' 9
1. The Shift From Per Se Ban to Facts and Circumstances
For many years, the IRS viewed non-profit participation as a
general partner in a joint venture with individuals or for-profit or-
ganizations as a presumptive cause for loss of exemption.2 0 The
prohibition arose from a concern that the exempt organization
would inappropriately further the interests of the for-profit part-
ners by participating in the partnership.2' For example, in GCM
37,259 the Service evaluated a revenue-sharing arrangement be-
tween an exempt maker of educational motion pictures and a
commercial film distributor and concluded that "the net earnings
of the organization clearly inure to the benefit of the distributor, in
which case the organization would lose its exemption. 22
17. MICHAEL 1. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 2
(3d ed. 2007).
18. Phil Royalty & Donna Steele Flynn, Not-For-Profit/For-ProfitJoint Ventures: A White Pa-
per, 25 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 37, 37 (1999).
19. SANDERS, supra note 17, at 5.
20. Royalty & Flynn, supra note 18, at 37.
21. Id. Commentators frequently attribute this concern to the fiduciary duties that a
general partner owes to its co-adventurers, and especially to limited partners. E.g., Darryll K.
Jones, Special Allocations and Preferential Distributions in Joint Ventures Involving Taxable and Tax
Exempt Entities, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13, 21 (2005) (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)). IRS guidance gives evidence to support this view. E.g., I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 36,293 (May 30, 1975) ("[A]s the general partner... the Corporation would
take on an obligation to further the private financial interests of the limited partners.").
However there is also evidence to suggest that the IRS viewed any profit sharing between an
exempt entity and a for-profit, regardless of how allocated, asperse private inurement. See id.
22. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,259 (Sept. 19, 1977).
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The Tax Court shattered this absolutist approach in 1980 by re-
jecting the Service's revocation of a non-profit theatre company's
exemption.23 When it encountered difficulty financing a produc-
tion, Plumstead Theatre Society entered into a joint venture with
two individuals and a for-profit corporation.24 Plumstead was the
general partner, and the three investors were limited partners who
would be entitled to a share of the profits or losses of the produc-
tion.25 The IRS gave three reasons for revoking Plumstead's exempt
status: 1) a substantial purpose of the organization was commer-
cial, 2) part of its earnings would inure to the benefit of a private
individual or shareholder, and 3) it operated for private rather
than public purposes.26 However, in its brief for the court, the Ser-
vice abandoned the private inurement rationale for revocation. As
a result, the only questions squarely presented to the court were
whether this joint venture caused the theatre to have a substantial
commercial purpose or to operate for private purposes.
The court's evaluation of these remaining questions makes clear
that mere participation in a joint venture no longer justifies the
automatic revocation of exempt status. First, the court described the
allegation of substantial commerciality as "completely misdirected., 28
It found that Plumstead's activities in advertising via newspapers, sell-
ing tickets, and hiring professional actors were not substantially
commercial. 9 Significantly, it also rejected the Service's position that
this single transaction, even if commercial, sufficed to jeopardize the
23. Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), affd per curiam, 675 F.2d
244 (9th Cir. 1982).
24. Id. at 1328.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1325. The IRS could have plausibly pressed an argument based on fiduciary
duties, but the opinion contains no reference to this argument, implying that either that the
argument was not made or the court dismissed it as not worth addressing.
27. Id. at 1334 n.3. Though not explicitly stated, the IRS likely recognized that under
its own long-standing regulations interpreting the meaning of "private shareholder or indi-
vidual" it would be unable to show that the investors had the necessary "personal and private
interest." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-i (c) (as amended in 1982). The opinion supports this sup-
position by recounting several facts that tend to show there was no inside or personal
relationship between Plumstead and the investors. See Plunstead, 74 T.C. at 1333-34. What-
ever the reason, the court clearly agreed that the argument was meritless. Id. at 1334 n.8
("[R]espondant has quite properly abandoned his initial argument.").
The lack of reference to fiduciary duties, and the Service's abandonment of the private
inurement rationale for revocation, is significant because fiduciary duties and private in-
urement were the two main rationales supporting the per se ban against joint ventures. See
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
28. Plumstead, 74 T.C. at 1331.
29. Id. at 1331-32.
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theater's exemption.30 Second, the court brushed aside the private
interest claim, stating that at most the play might be subject to unre-
lated business income tax if it had profits, but that the circumstances
did not warrant loss of exemption."'
Shortly after Plumstead the IRS released GCM 39,005, which articu-
lated a two-part test for evaluating the effect on a non-profit's
tax-exempt status from its participation as general partner in a joint
venture." The test initially focuses on whether the non-profit serves a
charitable purpose through the venture.3 If so, the second inquiry is
whether the structure of the venture permits it to act exclusively in
furtherance of the charitable purpose and not for the benefit of the
limited partners.34 This early expression of what has become known
as the "private benefit doctrine" sounds both unequivocal and pro-
hibitive. However, the IRS interprets "exclusively" to mean
"primarily,"s0 and GCM 39,005 itself, as well as the Plumstead decision,
made it clear that the limited partners are not expected to forego a
reasonable return on investment in the venture.36 Professor John
Columbo describes the permissibility of non-profit/for-profit joint
ventures after GCM 39,005 as "a matter of individual facts and cir-
cumstances. 3 ' Despite the strong-sounding language of the two-part
test, hundreds of subsequent private letter rulings applying the test
have concluded that exempt organizations could serve as general
partners in joint ventures withoutjeopardizing their exempt status.
3Y
30. Id. at 1331 ("Respondent took a still shot of what is an ongoing motion picture of
many dimensions."). The IRS relied on Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279
(1945), for the proposition that a single substantial non-exempt purpose was sufficient to
defeat exemption. Plumstead, 74 T.C. at 1330. Nevertheless this transactional approach has
become an important element of the private benefit doctrine. See discussion infra Part II.A.1;
see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). Furthermore, the IRS continues to
rely on Better Business Bureau in its guidance. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22,
1991); Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
31. Plumstead, 74 T.C. at 1334 n.8.
32. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983); see also Royalty & Flynn, supra
note 18, at 38.
33. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983).
34. Id.
35. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (c) (as amended in 2008).
36. Indeed GCM 39,005 condones the partnership even though the limited partners
are entitled to preferential returns. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983). See also
Plumstead, 74 T.C. at 1328 (approving venture where investors were entitled to 63.5% of
profits).
37. John D. Columbo, A Framework for Analyzing Exemption and UBIT Effects ofJoint Ven-
tures, 34 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 187, 187 (2001). For example, the many facts and
circumstances that can contribute to a joint venture passing the two-part test include the
following: independent oversight of the exempt organization's actions as general partner,
real and substantial initial contributions by the for-profit partner and allocations based on
them pro rata, and liability and risks are not borne disproportionately by the non-profit
partner. Royalty & Flynn, supra note 18, at 38.
38. Royalty & Flynn, supra note 18, at 39.
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2. Necessity Creates Strange Bedfellows
There are two basic categories of joint venture: "whole hospital"
and "ancillary."9 In whole hospital joint ventures, one partner,
usually the non-profit, contributes the total assets and operations
of a hospital while the other partner contributes funds and other
assets. 40 Going forward, the for-profit entity formed by the venture
operates the hospital.4 ' Ancillary joint ventures, by contrast, involve
substantially less than the contribution of an entire hospital, such
as the shared operation of a particular specialized facility or de-
partment.42 However, as discussed in Part II.B.2, the scope of the
joint venture in comparison to the hospital's overall charitable ac-
tivity can be a critical factor in continuing to qualify for exemption.
Ancillary joint ventures can take a wide variety of forms, including
ambulatory surgical centers, substance abuse treatment centers,
imaging centers, and kidney dialysis centers.3
The prevalence of joint ventures between non-profit hospitals
and for-profit entities may be surprising. During the 1980s, the
number of such ventures more than doubled, reaching around
450." Recent estimates of the number of ancillary joint ventures
are in the thousands.45 Whole hospital joint ventures are compara-
tively rare, currently numbering between 50 and 100.46
Nevertheless, some commentators have speculated that virtually all
health care organizations will eventually be forced to affiliate with a
47larger system to survive.
There are several reasons for the increasing popularity of health
care joint ventures. First, reimbursement for inpatient care has
39. Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change Its Stance on Exempt
Organizations in AncillaiyJoint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 25 (2005).
40. Id. at 26.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Eileen M. Newell, Comment, HealthcareJoint Ventures: Pushing Tax-Exempt Law to the
Limits?, 18J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 467, 475 (2002) (citing numerous private letter
rulings approving ancillaryjoint ventures of the aforementioned types).
44. Gary J. Young, Federal Tax-Exemption Requirements for Joint Ventures Between Nonprofit
Hospital Providers and For-Profit Entities: Form Over Substance?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 327, 338
(2004).
45. Id. at 339.
46. Michael I. Sanders, Health Care Joint Ventures Between Tax-Exempt Organizations and
For-Profit Entities, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 83, 84 (2005).
47. SANDERS, supra note 17, at 492.
48. One practitioner, who is also an adjunct professor, has categorized health care
joint ventures as defensive, offensive, or a combination of the two, depending on whether
the hospital attempts to protect itself from competition, to take advantage of revenue pro-
ducing or protecting opportunities, or both. Steven H. Pratt, Hospital-Physician Joint Venture
Risky Ventures
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declined substantially since the 1990s. 49 The rapid growth in mar-
ket share of managed care organizations has cut into hospitals'
profit margins as negotiating leverage has become more concen-
trated.50 Changes in Medicare reimbursement, including the shift
from fee-for-service to payment based on diagnosis-related groups,
and scheduled yearly reductions, have also had a major impact.
5'
Second, competition also drives joint venture activity. The
growth of for-profit hospital systems has caused numerous hospital
closings, as well as many acquisitions of struggling non-profit hos-
pitals.2 At the same time, hospitals face increasing competition
from smaller, specialized entities like imaging or surgery centers,
and even from their own physicians. 3 Such challenges frequently
arise in extremely profitable outpatient services such as orthopedic
or cardiac surgery.54 A health system general counsel recently la-
mented, "[T]he business is being divided up into little pieces
... [that] are being taken away one at a time ....
Finally, there are practical business reasons for a non-profit
hospital to engage in a joint venture. By partnering with its physi-
cians, a hospital may prevent them from competing on their
own.56 Additionally, in both ancillary and whole hospital joint ven-
tures, the hospital gains access to managerial and technical
expertise and is better able to spread the risks of a new venture
17and to stretch its capital resources.
Relationships: A Useful Tool to Improve Hospital Services, 4 IND. HEALTH L. Rv. 239, 244-45
(2007).
49. Young, supra note 44, at 339.
50. Id. at 339-40. Essentially, as health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") and pre-
ferred provider organizations ("PPOs") have taken over large shares of the health insurance
market, their ability to negotiate for reduced rates or to impose "capitated" payments, rather
than paying according to the traditional fee-for-service model, has driven down reimburse-
ment rates. Id.
51. See id.; SANDERS, supra note 17, at 492. Combined with the reimbursement reduc-
tions attributable to private managed care organizations, the shift of Medicare to a managed
care model means that health care providers are facing significant, across-the-board cuts in
revenue.
52. Sanders, supra note 46, at 84.
53. Young, supra note 44, at 340.
54. Id.; see also Symposium, Hospital-Physician Joint Ventures: A Promising Partnership?, 4
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 263, 266 (2007) (comments of Norman G. Tabler) ("[T]he new physi-
cian-hospital ventures you hear about, are almost invariably specialty hospitals, and it is not
an accident that the specialties that are hit are the high-income specialties.").
55. Symposium, supra note 54, at 275.
56. Young, supra note 44, at 341. It is well known that patient-physician relationships
are among the main reasons patients select a hospital; thus, maintaining stable hospital-
physician relationships is essential to the financial health of the hospital. However, the Of-
fice of the Inspector General within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services closely
polices joint ventures to ensure that they do not improperly induce referrals. See infra note
98 for a brief discussion of federal fraud and abuse standards.
57. Young, supra note 44, at 341.
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B. Reviewing the Requirements for Hospital Tax Exemption
The previous section explained how the IRS has changed its
position to allow exempt organizations to participate in joint ven-
tures and why non-profit hospitals have come to embrace them.
In this section, I will provide an overview of the requirements that
apply to all organizations seeking tax exemption, as well as the
specific charitable standards that exempt hospitals must meet.
Finally, I will introduce the two main organizational structures
through which a hospital may operate ajoint venture.
1. The Organizational and Operational Tests
Section 501 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code provides numer-
ous types of qualifying organizations with exemption from federal
income taxation.58 The best-known category is described under
§ 501 (c) (3), exempting corporations "organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, . . . literary, or edu-
cational purposes." 9 The regulations implementing § 501 (c) (3)
have interpreted the statute as setting two distinct requirements,
formulated as the "organizational test" and the "operational
test." ° Furthermore, through these two tests, § 501 (c) (3) prohib-
its the inurement of any part of net earnings to the benefit of
private shareholders, bars the organization from participation in
political campaigns, and limits legislative lobbying to an insub-
61stantial part of the organization's activities.
The organizational test requires that the applicant's constitutive
documents, such as its articles of organization or incorporation,
limit the organization to one or more purposes for which exemp-
tion may be granted and implicitly prohibit the organization from
engaging in more than an insubstantial amount of activities that
are not in furtherance of exempt purposes.62 The organization's
58. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006). In addition to exemption from federal income tax, recog-
nition under § 501(c) (3) confers numerous other benefits. These include, among others,
tax deductions for donors to the organization, the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds to raise
capital, and in many states automatic exemption from property and sales taxation. I.R.C.
§§ 145, 170(c)(2) (2006); see, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23701d(c)(1) (West 2008).
59. I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3). Section 501 (c) (3) also specifies several other, less well-known
purposes that qualify for exemption.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (a) (as amended in 1990).
61. I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3); Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-I.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (b). The organizational test also separately requires that
the articles not expressly permit the organization to participate in political activities or en-
gage in more than an insubstantial amount of lobbying. Id.
Risky Ventures
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purposes may be stated specifically, or as broadly as the description
in § 501 (c) (3) .6 To meet the prohibition against private inure-
ment, the articles must specify the disposition of the organization's
assets upon dissolution. Distributions to another exempt organiza-
tion or to federal, state, or local governments are acceptable;
however, if the articles permit distributions to members or share-
holders, the applicant will fail the organizational test.64
The operational test, in contrast, looks to what the organization
actually does rather than what it is chartered to do. Under the op-
erational test, the organization must operate exclusively for exempt
purposes.65 The IRS has interpreted this requirement as meaning
that the organization must engage primarily in activities that will
accomplish one or more such purposes.6 6 If more than an insub-
stantial part of an organization's activities does not further an
exempt purpose, the IRS will not regard it as exempt.67
However, as the emphasis on exempt purpose, rather than activity,
should make clear, an exempt organization does not jeopardize its
exemption by engaging in even a substantial amount of activities
that are not themselves exempt, so long as those activities further an
exempt purpose. Further, the provision for unrelated business in-
come tax ("UBIT") permits exempt organizations to engage in some
amount of unrelated commercial activity without loss of exemption,
though the profits from such activity may be subject to taxation."
However, as with the organizational test, the operational test imple-
ments the ban on private inurement. If any part of the net earnings
of the organization inures to the benefit of a private individual or
shareholder,6 9 the organization will fail the operational test.7°
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3).
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-l (c).
67. Id.
68. I.R.C. § 501 (b); I.R.C. §§ 511-514 (2006).
69. The Service has interpreted "private individual or shareholder" as meaning "per-
sons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(a)-1(c). For practical purposes, the ban on private inurement applies to certain
disqualified persons including organizational insiders and family members, but not to unre-
lated third parties. People of God Cmty. v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 127 (1980).
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-l (c) (2). The operational test also implements limitations
on political activity and lobbying. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-I (c) (3).
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2. Uncompensated Care or Community Benefit
Health care is not among the enumerated purposes for which
exemption may be granted under § 501 (c) (3).7" However, care for
the sick and support of hospitals has been considered a charitable
purpose since at least the enactment of the Statute of Charitable
Uses in 1601.72 In the United States, charitable health care has tra-
ditionally been the provision of uncompensated care to the poor."
For example, until as recently as 1969 the IRS required that to be
recognized as charitable, a hospital must operate to the extent of
74its financial ability for those not able to pay.
However, following the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid,
which were expected to decrease dramatically the number of pa-
tients who were unable to pay,75 the IRS revised its position and
specifically eliminated the uncompensated care requirement of
Revenue Ruling 56-185.76 In its place, the Service articulated what
has come to be known as the "community benefit standard," which
recognizes that hospitals often provide a variety of public benefits
beyond merely uncompensated care.7 The ruling presented two
scenarios, one good and one bad, to illustrate the sorts of "facts
and circumstances" the IRS would henceforth evaluate in deter-
mining whether a hospital was operating for the benefit of the
community rather than for the benefit of its private owners.7" Fac-
tors tending to show that a hospital benefits the community
include operating an emergency room open to all persons, placing
control over the hospital in a board composed of independent
community leaders, and maintaining an open medical staff with
privileges available to all qualified physicians.79
Since the 1969 ruling, the community benefit standard has be-
come even more diffuse. For example, in 1983 the Service issued a
ruling stating that operating an open emergency room was not a
per se requirement for charitable exemption, particularly when the
services would be unnecessary or duplicative, or where the hospital
serves a specialty such as eye surgery or cancer care for which
71. I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3).
72. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT: STATE AND FED-
ERAL LAW AND SUPERVIsION 23-24 (Russell Sage Found. 1965).
73. Young, supra note 44, at 330-31.
74. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
75. Young, supra note 44, at 331.
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emergency care is not typically provided. s Similarly, in certain cir-
cumstances hospitals appear to be able to partially close their
medical staffs with regard to certain departments or procedures
without affecting their exempt status.81
Critics have questioned the continued validity of the community
benefit standard. Specifically, they have noted only small differ-
ences between non-profit and for-profit hospitals in both the
amounts of uncompensated care delivered as well as the quality of
services as measured by outcomes. 2 There are signs that the IRS
may agree. In 2001, it issued a Field Service Advisory stating that a
policy to provide uncompensated care is insufficient to satisfy the
community benefit standard . Instead, the hospital "must show
that it actually provided significant health care services to the indi-
gent. ""' Similarly, in 2006 the Service submitted a questionnaire to
several hundred tax-exempt hospitals asking about their commu-
nity benefit services. The results led to significant changes in
annual reporting requirements for exempt hospitals. 5 This process
reportedly represents a first step in ongoing review of the commu-
nity benefit standard. s However, community benefit remains the
benchmark by which hospitals satisfy their charitable obligations,
at least for now.
3. Possible Organizational Structures
There are two basic structures by which a non-profit hospital
may engage in ajoint venture: directly, or through a subsidiary.8' In
80. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
81. See Mateo-Woodburn v. Fresno Cmty. Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 270 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990); Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, 621 N.W.2d 150 (S.D. 2001).
82. E.g., M. Gregg Bloche, Tax Preferences for Nonprofits: From Per Se Exemption to Pay-For-
Performance, HEALTH AFF.,June 20, 2006, at W304.
83. I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory 2001-10030 (Mar. 9, 2001), 2001 WL 234018.
84. Id.
85. Exempt organizations with more than $25,000 in gross receipts are required to
make annual disclosures to the IRS using Form 990, or the shorter 990-EZ if certain criteria
are met. Beginning with Tax Year 2008, Form 990 has undergone a major redesign, which
other articles have discussed exhaustively. Exempt hospitals will also now also be required to
attach the new Schedule H, which requests detailed information about the hospital's com-
munity benefit activities. See Internal Revenue Service, Overview of Form 990 Redesign For Tax
Year 2008, (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/overview__form_
990__redesign.pdf, for a discussion of the Form 990 redesign.
86. I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-132 (July 19, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=172416,00.html.
87. Once again, this is a simplification. In addition to the structures relevant to the is-
sues this Note raises, exempt organizations have the option to invest as passive limited
partners or non-managing members of a limited liability company. For tax purposes, this is
treated much like holding shares in a corporation in that it is considered an investment
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what I will call a "direct joint venture," the hospital partners with a
for-profit entity such as an outpatient clinic or a physician group to
undertake a particular project or business. Either a partnership or
a limited liability company ("LLC") will be established to run the
operation; because of their liability shields, LLCs have now re-
placed partnerships as the entity of choice.8 The use of either a
partnership or an LLC that has elected pass-through taxation is
necessary due to the attribution principle, discussed below.
To understand the importance of attribution, a brief explana-
tion of how the IRS classifies business entities is necessary. For
federal tax purposes, business entities involving two or more par-
ties are classified either as corporations or as partnerships.89 By
default, unincorporated entities with more than two members, in-
cluding LLCs, are classified as partnerships.90  The default
classification can be changed either initially or at a later time at the
entity's election.9' Since the joint venture vehicle will be a for-profit
entity, its profits are subject to income taxation. If the entity is re-
garded as a partnership, tax liability for its earnings will be passed
through to the partners-the non-profit hospital and the for-profit
entity.9 2 Additionally, the joint venture's activities will be attributed
to the individual partners.93If the activities substantially relate to
the exempt purposes of the hospital, its share of the earnings will
not be subject to income taxation. °
Conversely, if a business entity is regarded as a corporation it will
be subject to corporate tax on its profits prior to distributing
rather than the operation of a trade or business. See SANDERS, supra note 17, at 17. On the
other end of the spectrum, health care entities in particular frequently use quite complex
structures including parent/child/sibling relationships and contractual or virtual joint ven-
tures such as joint operating agreements to achieve their goals. See John C. Columbo,
Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on Commercial Activity By Charities, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 667, 668 (2007). The issues that such complicated arrangements raise are beyond the
scope of this Note. Finally, a hospital always has the option of engaging directly in a particu-
lar activity, such as running a gift shop or pharmacy, without the use of ajoint venture.
88. SANDERS, supra note 17, at 13.
89. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2007).
90. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (1) (as amended in 2006).
91. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a); see also SANDERS, supra note 17, at 109 (discussing LLC
check-the-box elections).
92. I.R.C. § 701 (2006).
93. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718; see also I.R.C. § 512(c) (2006).
94. However, there are circumstances under which even the non-profit hospital will be
required to pay taxes on its partnership returns. In 1950, Congress enacted the UBIT, re-
quiring an exempt organization to pay tax on the proceeds from any regularly carried on
trade or business unrelated to its charitable purposes. I.R.C. §§ 511-514 (2006). I discuss
UBIT and the issues of relatedness and substantiality in more detail below in Part II.B.2.
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dividends to its shareholders. 9' However, the IRS will not normally
attribute its activities to its shareholders. 96 While the prospect of a
guaranteed level of taxation appears to be undesirable, I will show
in Parts II.B and III.A that hospitals have increasingly compelling
reasons for avoiding attribution of the joint venture's activities.97
This leads to the second structure by which a hospital can en-
gage in a joint venture: through a for-profit subsidiary. What
differentiates this from a direct joint venture is that here, it is the
for-profit subsidiary, rather than the hospital, that forms the joint
venture with the third-party for-profit partner. Using this structure
may insulate the hospital parent from attribution of the joint ven-
ture's activities, and thus helps to eliminate the risk of the hospital
losing its tax exemption. A diagram may help clarify the difference












95. LR.C. § Il(a) (2006).
96. SANDERS, supra note 17, at 240. The qualifier "normally" is necessary because the
IRS will disregard corporate structures where the subsidiary is a mere sham or instrumental-
ity of the parent. Id. at 239. While ownership of 100% of the stock and the ability to appoint
an entire board of directors do not necessarily indicate that the subsidiary has no independ-
ent purpose, factors such as involvement in the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary and
non-arm's-length transactions increase the likelihood that the Service will disregard the
corporate boundary. Id. at 240.
97. See also id. at 239-40.
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II. CURRENT ENFORCEMENT MAKES DIRECT
JOINT VENTURING RISKY
Part II recounts the evolution of joint venture oversight to the
current regime of close scrutiny98 with an emphasis on control as a
principal, or even dispositive, factor. Part II.A discusses the Ser-
vice's formal guidance and key cases that establish the current
standards. Part II.B attempts to unpack these standards and apply
them in the context of direct ancillary joint ventures, and con-
cludes that the current regime imposes a great deal of risk for such
structures.
A. New and Tighter Standards
In many ways, the IRS unveiled the modern era of joint venture
oversight when it issued GCM 39,862 in late 1991Y.9 The memoran-
dum took the freshly ratified private benefit doctrine that had
been lurking around the edges of various IRS rulings and litigation
positions for years and thrust it into the spotlight."' With its abro-
gation of three previously issued private letter rulings approving
joint ventures, it also foreshadowed a stricter application of the
"close scrutiny" called for under the GCM 39,005 two-part test."0
The next three sections examine the development of the current
enforcement regime and evaluate its effect on the risks of engaging
in directjoint ventures.
98. While this Note addresses only the tax exemption issues related to health care joint
ventures, practitioners must carefully address several other statutory and regulatory consid-
erations. Chief among these are antitrust concerns, the anti-kickback statute, and the Stark
law. For a discussion of antitrust regulation in the health care joint venture arena, see Jona-
than M. Joseph, Note, Hospital Joint Ventures: Charting a Safe Course Through a Sea of Antitrust
Regulations, 13 AM.J. L. & MED. 621 (1987-1988). For an analysis of the impact of the anti-
kickback statute and Stark law on health care joint ventures, see David N. Heard, Jr., Note,
The Specialty Hospital Debate: The Difficulty of Promoting Competition Without Stifling Efficiency, 6
Hous.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 215 (2005).
99. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
100. Id.;John D. Columbo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REv. 1063, 1064, 1069-
70 (2006).
101. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991); see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,005 (June 28, 1983).
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1. Private Benefit Emerges as a Key Enforcement Tool
Even before the IRS formally allowed non-profits to participate
in joint ventures with for-profit entities, it was concerned with the
problem of private benefit. 102 Indeed, the Revenue Ruling that es-
tablished the community benefit standard for hospitals concluded
in its "bad" scenario that factors showing that the hospital operated
for the private benefit of its owners disqualified the hospital from
exemption. 03 However, although the Service had referenced pri-
vate benefit in various rulings and litigation positions for some
time, it had been unsuccessful in persuading a court that a viola-
tion of the doctrine was sufficient ground for revocation. 104 One
possible explanation for this failure is that the doctrine itself has
eluded clear definition.'5 Even within the IRS, there has been con-
fusion and inconsistency in interpreting and articulating the
doctrine.'°6
In 1987, the Service tried to provide guidance to explain what it
looked for when evaluating possible violations of the private bene-
S • 107
fit doctrine. It described private benefit as "serv[ing] a private
interest more than incidentally."'08 Though incidental amounts of
private benefit pose no threat to exemption, both qualitative and
quantitative limitations apply. Qualitatively, the private benefit
must be a necessary concomitant of an activity benefiting the pub-
lic at large; quantitatively, the benefit must be insubstantial in light
102. See Columbo, supra note 100, at 1068-69 (noting that IRS has considered private
benefit a limitation on exempt status for thirty years).
103. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
104. Columbo, supra note 100, at 1070-71.
105. See id. at 1064. For a thorough evaluation of the lack of statutory textual basis for a
prohibition on private benefit and the transformation of the common law doctrine from a
class-size emphasis to an incident of private service emphasis, see generally id.
106. See Columbo, supra note 100; see also United Cancer Council v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d
1173 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the Service's allegation of private inurement and remanding
on private benefit claim arising from same facts); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22,
1991) (describing the same conduct as both violating private inurement and also conferring
more than incidental private benefit). Nevertheless, GCM 39,598 conclusively establishes
private benefit as a distinct basis for analyzing the effect ofjoint ventures on exemption. See
Columbo, supra note 100, at 1072.
The IRS has recently amended its regulations to provide several new examples intended
to illustrate the requirement that an organization serve a public rather than a private inter-
est. T.D. 9390, 2008-18 I.R.B. 855 (amending Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1). Whether or not
these examples will eliminate confusion has yet to be seen. However, the Service expressly
declined invitations received during the rulemaking comment period to revise the existing
standards and intends the new examples to merely "clarify the principles of the private
benefit doctrine under existing law." Id.




of the overall benefit conferred by the activity. '9 The tolerance of
an incidental amount of private benefit is one key distinction be-
tween the private benefit doctrine and the ban on private
inurement. The other primary difference is that the prohibition
against private inurement applies only to a "private individual or
shareholder,"'" 0 while impermissible private benefit can be con-
ferred upon anyone.
Despite this explanation, the IRS struggled to convince a court
to adopt its view that private benefit was distinct from the well-
established ban on private inurement, and sufficient in its own
right to qualify as a basis for revocation. However, eventually the
Service prevailed on a claim of private benefit before the Tax
Court. In American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, the court
found that in spite of a large charitable class and a proper exempt
purpose of education, a school conferred more than incidental
private benefit on the Republican Party because most of its stu-
dents ended up working for or supporting it."' The case clearly
adopted private benefit as a stand-alone doctrine, with a broader
reach than the prohibition on private inurement, which is applica-
ble only to insiders." 2 In a further triumph for the Service, the court
also approved of a case-by-case process of reviewing individual trans-
actions for private benefit.' '3 As a result, even comparatively
insignificant joint ventures-as compared to the organization's
overall charitable activity-will jeopardize the organization's exemp-
tion if they confer more than incidental private benefit.
With its success in American Campaign Academy, the IRS began us-
ing private benefit aggressively in policing joint venture
arrangements.' 4 In GCM 39,862, the IRS set its sights on joint ven-
tures in which hospitals had sold future revenue streams at fair
market value to physician investors in arms-length transactions.15
Private letter rulings had previously approved three such arrange-
ments; however, once viewed through the newly polished lens of
private benefit, all were found to be incompatible with exempt status
and the memorandum recommended that the previous rulings be
109. Id.
110. Seesupra note 69 and accompanying text.
111. 92 T.C. 1053, 1072 (1989).
112. Id. at 1063, 1078.
113. Id.; see also Columbo, supra note 100, at 1073-74.
114. Columbo, supra note 100, at 1074.
115. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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revoked."6 The message was quite clear: joint ventures were no
longer to be taken for granted.
2. Control Test Articulated in Whole Hospital Context
The next major development in creating the current joint
venture oversight environment was the release of Revenue Ruling
98-15."' Prior to the ruling, practitioners had been limited to re-
viewing inconsistent and non-precedential private letter rulings to
divine the possible effects on exemption of variousjoint ventures."
8
Revenue Ruling 98-15, issued in response to the rapid growth in
non-profit/for-profit joint ventures, finally provided solid insight
into how the Service would evaluate such arrangements. "9
The ruling presents and analyzes two factual scenarios, one pass-
ing scrutiny and the other resulting in revocation. 120 Both scenarios
involve non-profit hospitals that directly form whole hospital joint
ventures with for-profit entities. The joint ventures are organized as
LLCs that elect pass-through taxation, resulting in the IRS attribut-
ing their activities to the partners. 12' In the "good" scenario, the
articles of organization for the joint venture explicitly give the non-
profit hospital majority representation on the board of directors,
mandate prioritization of community benefit over profit maximiza-
tion, and provide for financial distributions in proportion to the
partners' ownership interests. 2 1 Management of the venture is
vested in an unrelated company, for reasonable compensation and
a five-year term. 2 In contrast, in the "bad" scenario, the board is
split evenly between the non-profit and for-profit, the articles con-
tain some blocking provisions but no explicit prioritization of
community benefit, and management of the venture is vested in a
116. Id. In addition to finding private benefit, the Service also determined that the
three ventures resulted in private inurement as well as likely violations of federal fraud and
abuse law. Id.
117. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
118. Young, supra note 44, at 342.
119. Mirkay, supra note 39, at 41.
120. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. For a much more thorough analysis of the ruling,
including additional "good" and "bad" factors that the Service relied upon, see Gerald M.
Griffith, Revenue Ruling 98-15: Dimming the Future of all Nonprofit Joint Venturesa?, 20 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REv. 405 (1998).
121. Id. Technically the owners of an LLC are usually described as "members" or
"shareholders"; however, the use of the term "partners" here is intended to comport with
IRS treatment of business entities rather than the law of business organizations, which varies
substantially from state to state, See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.




subsidiary of the for-profit organization and two of its former ex-
ecutives.
124
In determining that the hospital in the "good" scenario contin-
ued to qualify for exempt status, the Service emphasized that the
organizational structure of the venture permitted it to act exclu-
sively in furtherance of its exempt purpose and only incidentally
for the benefit of the for-profit partners . The hospital's retention
of formal control over the venture was the dispositive factor.12 6 In
the "bad" scenario, shared control did not ensure that exempt
purposes would trump the service of private interests, and the arti-
cles lacked structural protections to elevate community benefit
over profit maximization. 127 Additionally, the relationships between
the management company, the for-profit entity, and its former em-
ployees who served as the venture's top executives created a
heightened risk of non-incidental private benefit. s2 Commentators
analyzing Revenue Ruling 98-15 widely agree that it raises organiza-




Two major cases decided after Revenue Ruling 98-15 affirm the
control test's dominance in determining whether a joint venture
jeopardizes exempt status. In Redlands Surgical Serices v. Commis-
sioner,130 a hospital entered into a joint venture with a for-profit
company through a wholly owned tax-exempt subsidiary.' The
only activity of the subsidiary, Redlands Surgical Services ("RSS"),
was its involvement with the partnership. 32 The partners shared
formal control over the venture equally, with RSS and the for-profit
124. Id. The ruling has frequently been criticized for setting up such polar opposite
scenarios and providing almost no guidance for the majority of structures that fall some-
where between these extremes. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 46, at 96; Young, supra note 44,
at 345.




129. E.g., Mirkay, supra note 39, at 44; Griffith, supra note 120, at 414.
130. 113 T.C. 47 (1999), affd per curiam, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). Numerous com-
mentators have conducted in-depth analyses of the Redlands decision. See, e.g., Young, supra
note 44, at 345-48; Sanders, supra note 46, at 105-08. For a particularly unique exposition,
see Darryll K. Jones, Private Benefit and the Unanswered Questions From Redlands, 89 TAX
NoTEs 121 (2000).
131. Redlands, 113 T.C. at 48-50. This scenario differs from the use of a for-profit sub-
sidiary described in Part 1B..3. Analytically, it makes sense to think of this structure as a
direct whole hospital joint venture between the subsidiary, Redlands Surgical Services, and
the for-profit entity; this tracks with the issue raised in the case, which is the qualification of
the subsidiary--not the parent hospital-for exemption. Id. at 48.
132. Id. at 48.
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entity each appointing two directors.3 3 The organizing documents
did not acknowledge a charitable purpose. 134 The arrangement in-
cluded a long-term management contract with a subsidiary of the
for-profit partner that conferred unusually broad powers.1
35
Without referencing Revenue Ruling 98-15, the*court found that
RSS had no effective formal control over the venture.3 6 The court
also looked for indicia of informal control and found none.137
Based on all the facts and circumstances, the court held that RSS
had not met the requirements for exemption under § 501 (c) (3)
and affirmed the decision of the Service to deny the subsidiary's
application for recognition of exemption.3 8 In a single paragraph
affirmation, the Ninth Circuit adopted the tax court's finding that
RSS had ceded control to the for-profit partner, as well as its hold-
ing that this conferred an exemption-precluding private benefit on
the partner.1
9
In St. David's Health Care System v. United States, 40 a non-profit
hospital challenged the retroactive revocation of its exempt status
and the imposition of back-taxes after an audit resulted in a de-
termination that its whole hospital joint venture prevented it from
acting exclusively in furtherance of its charitable mission. 14 1 Voting
control of the joint venture was, as in Redlands, divided equally be-
tween the hospital and the for-profit partner, and day-to-day
management was vested in a subsidiary of the for-profit partner.
42
But unlike Redlands, the organizing documents and management
contract included numerous provisions intended to tie the venture
to the hospital's charitable purpose. These included specifically
requiring the partnership to operate in compliance with the com-
munity benefit standard; permitting the hospital to unilaterally
terminate the CEO, the management contract, or the entire ven-
133. Id. at 68.
134. Id. at 67.
135. Id. at 48, 82-83. For example, the management company was authorized to unilat-
erally set patient charges and to negotiate reimbursement rates with third-party payors.
Delegation of these key powers gave the management company effective operational con-
trol. Id.
136. Id. at 78-85.
137. Id. at 85-88.
138. Id. at 92.
139. Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm'r, 242 F.3d 904, 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
140. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453 (W.D. Tex. 2002), vacated, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir.
2003). As with Redlands, this case has been thoroughly analyzed. See, e.g., Young, supra note
44, at 348-52; Sanders, supra note 46, at 108-11.
141. St. David's, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453, at *3-5.
142. St. David's, 349 F.3d at 241-42. The appellate opinion includes a more detailed re-
cital of facts than the district court opinion.
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ture; and providing that neither partner could initiate board action
without the support of the other.
143
The trial court, remarking that "it is difficult to imagine a corpo-
rate structure more protective of an organization's charitable
purpose," concluded that St. David's continued to qualify for ex-
empt status and granted the hospital's motion for summary
judgment.1 44 However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, noting that the
blocking provisions only allowed St. David's to veto detrimental
actions but did not empower it to ensure that the partnership took
new actions serving charitable purposes.1 45 Further, St. David's fi-
nancial circumstances during the formation of the venture
suggested that the parties' negotiating power was significantly un-
balanced,1 4 6 and the agreement contained a non-compete clause
that might deter St. David's from exercising its power to dissolve
the venture. 1 7 Because these issues raised questions of material fact
as to whether St. David's had ceded control, the court vacated the
order for summaryjudgment and remanded the case for trial.48 In
its analysis, the court expressly referenced Revenue Ruling 98-15,
noting that such rulings were entitled to "significant weight.'
49
3. Control in AncillaryJoint Ventures
Because Revenue Ruling 98-15, Redlands, and St. David's all in-
volved whole hospital joint ventures, considerable uncertainty
remained over the standards that would be applied to ancillary
joint ventures.15 1 In 2004, the IRS released a new revenue ruling
intended to provide precedential guidance specifically for ancillary
joint ventures.'1 Revenue Ruling 2004-51 presented a single fact
pattern involving an exempt university that had entered into a
joint venture with a for-profit entity for the purposes of producing
143. Id. at 240-41.
144. St. David's, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453, at *24-25.
145. St. David's, 349 F.3d at 242.
146. Id. at 239.
147. Id. at 244. The non-compete clause barred both St. David's and HCA, the for-profit
partner, from operating in the Austin area for two years following dissolution. However,
while HCA was a nationwide operator of hospitals and could survive the non-compete pe-
riod relatively unscathed, St. David's would have been utterly ruined because its only service
area was Austin. Id.
148. Id. After trial, a jury found for St. David's on the issue of exemption. St. David's
Health Care Sys. v. United States, 2004 WL 555095, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
149. St. David's, 349 F.3d at 240 & n.9.
150. E.g., Young, supra note 44, at 353; Columbo, supra note 100, at 1077.
151. Mirkay, supra note 39, at 57.
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interactive video training programs that would enhance the skills
of elementary and secondary school teachers. s-2 Although the ven-
ture was a 50-50 partnership, with a board of directors split evenly
between the two entities, the operational aspects of the program
were fully bifurcated.1 3 The university retained exclusive control
over all of the educational1 54 aspects of the venture, such as the cur-
riculum, training materials, and instructors.1 55 The for-profit
partner retained exclusive control over pure business issues, for
example, selecting locations for receiving the video link and choos-
ing non-educational personnel, such as camera operators.15 6 The
articles organizing the venture restricted it to conducting the
teaching seminars, and required that it negotiate any transactions
at arm's-length and at fair market value. 57
The ruling stipulated that the joint venture was an insubstantial
part of the university's overall activities, thus participation in the ven-
ture, taken alone, would not affect the university's tax-exempt
status.15s As will be discussed below, the issue of substantiality is a
well-established element of the operational test, so this was certainly
a relevant issue. 5 However, this abrupt disposal of the exemption
issue without any analysis of the private benefit doctrine is odd. Al-
though the ruling cited important sources-Revenue Ruling 98-15,
Redlands, and St. David's-all of which found impermissible private
benefit where joint ventures failed the control test, it did not under-
take a similar evaluation of this venture It is puzzling why the
Service, having established private benefit as an independent and
sufficient ground for revocation, and having indicated that it
would be applied on a per-transaction basis, would omit the con-
sideration of the doctrine altogether.
1 61
With the majority of its text focusing on the "substantially re-
lated" prong of UBIT162 the ruling determined that the university's
joint venture provided the same educational content as programs
152. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 974.
153. Id.
154. Education is one of the purposes for which the IRS recognizes exemption. I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3) (2006). For the purposes of applying this ruling to ancillary joint ventures in
health care, "educational" can be read as if it means "charitable."




159. "Substantiality" in the context of the operational test is easily confused with "sub-
stantially related" as a factor in the UBIT analysis. See infra Part II.B.2 (attempting to unpack
these distinct concepts).
160. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 974; see alsoColumbo, supra note 100, at 1078-79.
161. Id.; see supra Part II.A.1.
162. See infra Part II.B.2.
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offered on the university campus, but extended the reach of the
program to individuals who could not be accommodated at or
conveniently travel to the campus.63 Because this activity impor-
tantly contributed to the accomplishment of the university's
educational purpose, it was not subject to UBIT.i Though the rul-
ing favorably cited the authorities establishing the control test, it
used control in a new way. Where control previously had been sig-
nificant for ferreting out illicit private benefit, here it was used in a
UBIT analysis to evaluate whether the venture's activities were sub-
stantially related to its exempt purposes.165
Revenue Ruling 2004-51 thus poses as many questions as it an-
swers. Some commentators have taken the view that the IRS has
loosened the control requirement, at least in the context of ancil-
166
lary joint ventures. 6G Others argue that the control test is alive and
well for all joint ventures, regardless of scope. In a thoroughly
unhelpful step, the IRS has recently announced that it will no
longer issue private letter rulings determining whether a given
joint venture will result in either revocation or the imposition of
UBIT1
68
B. Applications and Consequences
Part II.A explained how the monitoring of non-profit/for-profit
joint ventures has evolved, from a nominal "close scrutiny" that
permitted a vast array ofjoint ventures, to an aggressive policing of
private benefit and control. But the Service's formal guidance
leaves substantial uncertainty about the boundaries between ven-
tures that exempt organizations can engage in without adverse
consequences and those that risk unrelated business income tax or
loss of exemption. To date, research in this area has focused either
upon theoretical analysis of what should happen under certain as-
sumptions' 69 or practical expositions on how to structure a venture
163. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 974.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also infra Part II.B.1 (analyzing the two possible meanings of control).
166. E.g., Columbo, supra note 100, at 1079 & n.81; Sanders, supra note 46, at 111
("[Clontrol of the entire venture is not essential ... as long as the exempt organization
controls the substantive, charitable aspects.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Mirkay, supra note 39, at 24. Professor Mirkay quotes unofficial comments of an
IRS Assistant Chief Counsel stating that Revenue Ruling 98-15 is still valid and that Revenue
Ruling 2004-51 does nothing to modify it. Id.
168. Rev. Proc. 2007-4, 2007-1 I.R.B. 118; see alsoSANDERS, supra note 17, at 209.
169. See Columbo, supra note 37, at 187-91; Sanders, supra note 46, at 112-20.
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to minimize the likelihood of a problem.1 70 Rather than following
these approaches, in this section I assume that the IRS actually
means what it has said and examine the consequences this could
have for direct joint ventures. The primary consideration for the
purposes of this Note is not what the Service is likely to do but
rather what it might do based on the signposts it has erected, and
the effect this may have on the selection ofjoint venture structure.
Then in Part III, I will assess the implications of this policy and
consider how it could be improved.
1. What Does "Control" Actually Mean?
The combination of Revenue Ruling 98-15, Redlands, and St.
David's has clearly established something known as a "control test"
as a dispositive element of whole hospital joint venture analysis,
and an important, if not dispositive, element of ancillary joint
venture analysis.17' But what part of the exemption requirements is
the test actually addressing? The aforementioned authorities all
emphasize the private benefit doctrine.17 In each situation, a non-
profit ceded control of its joint venture to the for-profit partner.
173
This was treated as a per se violation of the private benefit doctrine:
"[W]e conclude that petitioner has in fact ceded effective control
... to for-profit parties, conferring upon them significant private
benefits, and therefore is not operated exclusively for charitable
purposes within the meaning of section 501 (c) (3) . The lack of
control revealed more than incidental private benefit and there-
fore triggered revocation.
However, Revenue Ruling 2004-51 used the control test to assess
whether or not a joint venture's activities were substantially related
to a university's educational mission. Finding that they were, the
Service determined that it would not impose UBIT. It disposed of
the question of revocation almost in passing, and did so solely
based on the insubstantiality of the venture's actions, relative to the
170. See SANDERS, supra note 17, at 205-09; see generallyJ. Patrick Plunkett & Heidi N.
Christianson, The Quest for Cash: Exempt Organizations, Joint Ventures, Taxable Subsidiaries, and
Unrelated Business Incone, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1 (2004).
171. See supra Part II.A.2-3.
172. See supra Part II.A.2.
173. Formal voting control as well as explicit provisions in the constitutive documents
were necessary to pass the control test in the revenue ruling. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B.
718. The courts were also willing to look for indicia of informal control. See supra Part IIA.2.
174. Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47, 78 (1999), afld per curiam, 242
F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001).
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university's overall exempt activities. 75 The ruling did not evaluate
whether private benefit resulted from the transaction.
Thus, on one hand we have a per se rule that ceding control over
a joint venture confers more than incidental private benefit on the
for-profit partner. From GCM 39,598 and American Campaign Acad-
emy, we know that this is grounds for revocation, regardless of how
large or small the joint venture is compared to the organization's
overall charitable activity.7 6 On the other hand, we have the propo-
sition that ceding control, at least of substantive charitable
activities, will probably cause the IRS to determine that the activi-
ties are not substantially related to the organization's exempt
purpose, and that at minimum UBIT should be imposed. Of
course, behind the UBIT analysis hides the ever-present opera-
tional test limitation that if the organization is not exclusively
(primarily) engaged in activities "in furtherance of' its exempt' 77
purpose, its exemption will be revoked. In sum, failing the con-
trol test can result in revocation on either private benefit or "in
furtherance of"7s grounds, or in the imposition of UBIT if the
activity is insubstantial relative to the other activities of the non-
profit.
79
175. See supra Part II.A.3. Because the IRS assumed that the activities were insubstantial,
it did not need to determine whether they were "in furtherance of" an exempt purpose. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-l (c).
176. See supra Part II.A.1.
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-i(c). For a detailed discussion of the relationship be-
tween "in furtherance of" as an operational test requirement, and "substantially related to"
as a UBIT factor, see John D. Columbo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44
WM. & MARY L. REv. 487, 495-514 (2002). Professor Columbo argues persuasively that the
IRS and courts have failed to adopt a coherent analytic framework to logically relate these
two measures to one another and to consistently dispose of revocation decisions arising
under them. For the purposes of this Note, it suffices to assert that their confusing similarity
makes it risky to assume that substantial activities deemed unrelated to the charitable pur-
pose would nevertheless somehow be considered in furtherance of it, saving the
organization from loss of exemption.
178. What this really means is failing the operational test. However, there are several
ways to fail the operational test, such as by engaging in excessive lobbying. From this point
forward, this Note is primarily concerned with one specific way to fail the operational test,
viz., by engaging in more than an insubstantial amount of activities that are not "in further-
ance of" a charitable purpose. I will use the phrase "in furtherance of' to denote this
limitation, but the reader should bear in mind that this is really an element of the opera-
tional test rather than a separate requirement for exemption.
179. Michael Sanders has engaged in a similar, if perhaps less pessimistic, analysis to the
one presented here, coining the phrase "UBIT plus Control" for his model. Sanders, supra
note 46, at 114-21. However, Mr. Sanders uses his model to derive a short list of best prac-
tices for keeping a direct joint venture out of trouble, whereas this Note is concerned with
the utility of a policy that generates risks of such a magnitude that, even if rarely realized,
create significant incentives to avoid the directjoint venture structure entirely.
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2. Relatedness and Substantiality
The preceding section explored the possible meanings of con-
trol in the context of private benefit and relatedness. However,
even if the non-profit has control, it can still find its exemption at
risk or be liable for UBIT, because control appears to be necessary
but not sufficient for an activity to be "substantially related" to the
organization's exempt purposes. As this Note has mentioned in
passing, even an exempt organization is permitted to engage in an
insubstantial amount of non-exempt activity without endangering
its exemption.'s" However, if the activity is not substantially related
to an exempt purpose, the organization may be subject to UBIT."'
This leaves us with two important questions: First, how much activ-
ity is insubstantial? And second, how can we tell whether an activity
is substantially related?
82
Because an activity that is substantially related to an exempt
purpose must, by definition, also be in furtherance of it,1"' I will
address the second question first; after all, if the activity is in fur-
therance of an exempt purpose then the "insubstantial" question is
irrelevant.'8 4 Unfortunately, we know little about when the IRS will
deem an activity substantially related. An activity is not substantially
related to an exempt purpose if its sole function is to provide fi-
nancial support, even if the organization could not survive or
would have to limit its operations without such support.85 An activ-
ity is substantially related if a "causal connection" exists between it
and the exempt purpose, and if the activity contributes importantly
to the accomplishment of the exempt purpose.'86 Analogizing from
180. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-i (c).
181. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006). There are exceptions to the imposition of tax liability, such
as a qualifier that the activity be a "trade or business" that is "regularly carried on" to name
two. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (as amended in 1983). This Note addresses the bulk of circum-
stances to which no exceptions apply.
182. These phrasings lend themselves to considerable awkwardness. In an attempt to
minimize confusion, I will discuss them in terms of "substantiality" and "relatedness." "Sub-
stantiality" refers to the scope of the activity, which ranges from insubstantial to primary.
"Relatedness" refers to the relationship between the activity of the venture and the organiza-
tion's exempt purposes. For the purposes of this Note, if an activity is "substantially related"
it will be assumed to also pass the "in furtherance of" test, and if an activity is unrelated it
will be assumed to fail the "in furtherance test." This is technically imprecise since an activity
could theoretically be unrelated-triggering UBIT liability-but still be in furtherance of an
exempt purpose. See Columbo, supra note 87, at 671. However, "in furtherance of" is simi-
larly poorly defined, and as Professor Columbo suggests, once an activity is determined to be
unrelated, courts tend to ignore the technical distinction. Id. at 505.
183. Columbo, supra note 87, at 671.
184. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (e).
185. Columbo, supra note 87, at 670.
186. Columbo, supra note 37, at 188.
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precedent is possible, but risky, since the determinations are ran-
dom and inconsistent. For example, a hospital pharmacy selling
drugs to the general public in addition to its patients is engaged in
unrelated activity, 18 but a hospital gift shop accessible to visitors
and employees is substantially related.1
8
If an activity is unrelated, then it should result in either the im-
position of UBIT or revocation. This brings the question of
substantiality to the forefront.'9 Again, there is little guidance and
no bright line test to help us know when an activity stops being in-
substantial.9 ° In the past, the IRS has denied exemption for entities
receiving between one-third and one-half of their revenues from
unrelated business.' 9' However, under a "commensurate-in-scope"
test it has also approved exemption based on the amount of time
and effort spent on exempt activity, regardless of the amount of
income from unrelated business. 92 In a call for more specific guid-
ance, one practitioner has urged the IRS to adopt a safe harbor
under which organizations whose unrelated joint ventures, in the
aggregate, have assets totaling less than ten to fifteen percent of
the non-profit's total assets would automatically pass the substanti-
ality test.' 93
Because the IRS does not measure substantiality on a per-
transaction basis, but rather by the aggregate of all unrelated
activities, the problem becomes even more complicated.'94 Under
this aggregation rule, joint ventures have the potential to threaten
exemption in two different, insidious ways. First, a hospital may
simply engage in too many unrelated activities that are each rela-
tively small, but taken together are more than insubstantial.'95 For
the purposes of aggregation, not only would joint ventures be
counted, but partnerless activities that the hospital engages in
would also be counted, such as directly running a pharmacy selling
drugs to the public. Routine institutional communication gaps or
187. Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1979).
188. Rev. Rul. 69-267, 1969-1 C.B. 160.
189. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (explaining the technical simplification
of this statement).
190. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1(c).
191. Mirkay, supra note 39, at 33.
192. Id. at 34 (citing an example where exemption was upheld for an organization de-
riving 98% of its revenue from bingo games, but 40% of its time and resources were used in
charitable service).
193. SANDERS, supra note 17, at 223.
194. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-I (c).
195. See Symposium, supra note 54, at 266 (comments of Norman G. Tablet) ("We have
a concern that the ever increasing number of taxable ventures will cause a substantial por-
tion of our operations to be for-profit, and that is a test that we cannot afford to fail.").
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the lack of formal monitoring of such activities could realistically
jeopardize exemption. The second problem is that a venture might
experience significant growth, such that at some point the IRS
would no longer consider it insubstantial.
1 96
The lack of clarity in determining relatedness and substantiality
adds additional risk to direct joint ventures. Even if a venture satis-
fies the control test, a non-profit can still be subject to UBIT if its
joint venture is deemed unrelated. Moreover, if the aggregate of all
of the non-profit's unrelated activity is or becomes substantial, ex-
emption can also be lost regardless of the non-profit's retention of
control.
III. ANALYSIS OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Part III analyzes the practical effect of currentjoint venture pol-
icy and concludes that it has been applied too bluntly, creating
unnecessary-and potentially harmful-incentives for hospitals to
engage in subsidiary, rather than direct, joint ventures. Part III.A
explains how the ability of a hospital to conduct joint ventures
through a for-profit subsidiary eliminates much. of the risk de-
scribed in the previous section and argues that the certainty of
corporate tax, though a drawback, is more than offset by this risk.
It further suggests that several business incentives, some independ-
ent and some caused by the current enforcement regime, also
make subsidiary joint ventures an attractive alternative to direct
joint ventures. The section concludes by evaluating likely conse-
quences of a shift towards the subsidiary joint venture structure.
Part III.B suggests that the IRS could use a combination of existing
enforcement tools, along with a more nuanced approach to mak-
ing exemption determinations. This would maintain the integrity
of the charitable exemption system while eliminating many of the
incentives to use subsidiary joint ventures instead of direct joint
ventures, particularly when the latter may be more socially benefi-
cial.
A. Subsidiary Joint Ventures: More Attractive But Less Charitable?
Part II.B showed that a non-profit engaging in a direct joint ven-
ture faces a number of uncertainties that could result in either
revocation of exemption or the imposition of UBIT. Though a
196. See SANDERS, supra note 17, at 27.
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hospital can structure a direct joint venture to minimize the
chances of triggering these land mines, St. David's teaches us that
even a carefully constructed venture can have severe hidden con-
sequences. I argue in this section that the aforementioned risks,
along with certain business factors, make the subsidiary joint ven-
ture structure more appealing, on balance, than it would be
otherwise.
As noted above, 97 exempt status under § 501 (c) (3) confers a vast
array of benefits on a hospital. Revocation is a devastating penalty
that a hospital would not dismiss lightly. This Note has already
thoroughly discussed the risk of revocation created by non-
profit/for-profit joint ventures. However, something more should
be mentioned with regard to tax liabilities. The primary drawback
to using a subsidiary joint venture is that it will be subject to at least
one level of normal corporate income tax, whereas a direct joint
venture may be tax-free to the non-profit partner. If, ex ante, the
hospital does not expect the venture to generate unrelated busi-
ness taxable income, the direct form will be financially superior. If
the IRS is likely to deem the joint venture unrelated and to impose
UBIT, then from a tax liability perspective, the hospital should
theoretically be indifferent to the form of the venture. 9 8 But sig-
nificant uncertainty arises about precisely how the IRS will decide
issues of relatedness, substantiality, and whether control has been
sufficiently reserved. When we add in this uncertainty, we see that a
hospital's real choice is between surrendering to guaranteed cor-
porate tax in the subsidiary form, or risking possible revocation for
the chance of avoiding UBIT in the direct form.
Besides risk-reduction, the subsidiary structure confers substan-
tial business benefits as well. It may make it easier for the hospital
to obtain financing for the joint venture, since creditors may be
more willing to lend capital to a for-profit entity than to an exempt
organization that they cannot force into involuntary bankruptcy if
it defaults. 99 It also eliminates the need for highly restrictive con-
trol structures and for binding distributions solely to ownership
197. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
198. This is so because the UBIT rate is the same as the corresponding corporate in-
come tax rate; therefore, the tax imposed will be the same under either source. I.R.C. §§ 11,
511(a) (1) (2006). The hospital faces no risk of so-called "double-taxation" in this scenario
because the income it receives from the subsidiary will probably take the form of dividends,
which are expressly excluded from the definition of unrelated business taxable income and
will therefore be treated as normal exempt revenues. I.R.C. § 512(b)(1) (2006). This simpli-
fication assumes that no offsetting losses, deductions, or other factors exist that might affect
the tax burden to either partner.
199. SANDERS, supra note 17, at 26.
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interests and initial contributions. 0 One commentator has argued
that obtaining even equal control is unrealistic and unattainable in
the current health care market.2 ' Additionally, though most analy-
ses of IRS joint venture policy presume that only two entities are
involved 202 from a real-world business perspective it may be desir-
able to involve more entities, particularly where the goals are
related to public health or welfare, as opposed to simply providing
a product and maximizing profits. 20 3 Finally, using a subsidiary
helps reduce the expensive legal analysis and drafting needed to
protect a hospital from the risk of revocation associated with a di-
rectjoint venture.
To the extent that non-profit hospitals respond to these risks
and incentives by choosing subsidiary joint venture structures
where they would have used direct joint ventures in a less restric-
tive regulatory environment, the time-honored question "so what?"
arises. After all, we can expect at least one outcome that does not
seem at all problematic: tax revenues should rise as health care
joint ventures conduct more activity in the taxable, rather than ex-
empt, environment.
However, one serious drawback to the increased use of subsidi-
ary joint ventures exists. Because the IRS will not impute the
ventures' activities to the hospital, no incentive remains for the
ventures to adhere closely to their parents' charitable mission. In-
deed, the converse is true: as a for-profit joint venture between two
for-profit entities, we can reasonably expect the venture to place a
high priority on profit maximization. While it is tempting to be-
lieve that a hospital has higher motivations, and would seek to
impose its charitable mission on the venture regardless of the
204structural form, good reasons exist to ignore this temptation. As
Professor Darryll Jones points out, hospitals depend heavily on
cross-subsidization where excess revenues from profitable services
200. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 21, at 16. Professor Jones recounts statements to the ef-
fect that no for-profit entity would ever subject itself to control by a non-profit.
201. Mirkay, supra note 39, at 59.
202. E.g.,Jones, supra note 21, at 13-14.
203. A multi-partyjoint venture could still conceivably be structured in a way that passes
the control test, but since this Note is primarily concerned with the effect of risk on incen-
tives, I would assert that the additional complexity of such a structure translates into an even
higher level of risk. Though a venture between two or more non-profits and one for-profit
seems comparatively less problematic, a venture between a single non-profit and two or
more for-profits would likely pose insurmountable business problems in establishing a level
of control sufficient to satisfy the Service, unless the for-profits were willing to act more or
less as mere passive investors.
204. In fact the IRS is apparently so convinced that exempt organizations do not behave




or departments fund other, very expensive departments or ser-
vices.05 In Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner, for example,
even while attempting to operate as an exempt entity, RSS had still
structured its venture to significantly limit the amount of Medicare,
Medi-Cal, and indigent care that it would provide. Similarly, it
ceded control over charges and reimbursement to the manage-
ment company affiliated with the for-profit partner. °7 Researchers
have found that for-profit health care entities typically charge five
to ten percent higher prices than comparable non-profits, and
have argued that the negative public impact may be tremendous.08
Therefore, a shift toward subsidiary joint ventures may mean a shift
away from community benefit.
B. Policy Refinements
The final section of this Note considers refinements to the cur-
rent enforcement regime that would maintain the integrity of the
charitable exemption system and also would eliminate the artifi-
cially heightened attractiveness of the subsidiary joint venture
structure.
Some commentators have called explicitly for the repudiation of
the control test with regard to ancillary joint ventures." 9 Professor
Columbo recently advocated a sweeping multi-part reform that in-
cludes restoring the "destination of income" test,"o taxing all
commercial activities conducted by charities whether related or
not,21 and evaluating private benefit on an aggregate rather than a
per-transaction basis. 2 Numerous commentators have called for in-
creased use of the UBIT framework as the proper tool for evaluating
205. See Jones, supra note 130, at 128.
206. 113 T.C. 47, 67-68 (1999);Jones, supra note 130 at 125 (noting that RSS would not
offer an emergency room, obstetrics, or neo-natal care).
207. Redlands, 113 T.C. at 59-60; see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
208. Mark Schlesinger & Bradford H. Gray, How Nonprofits Matter in American Medicine,
and What To Do About It, HEALTH ArF.,June 20, 2006, at W296-W297.
209. E.g., Mirkay, supra note 39, at 67-68. Professor Mirkay does not propose the elimi-
nation of the control test in the whole hospital context, however. Id. While I agree that
control has relevance in the whole hospital context, the reforms I suggest here would be
applicable and effective in both whole hospital and ancillary joint ventures.
210. Columbo, supra note 87, at 687-88. Briefly, the destination of income test permit-
ted an organization to engage in unlimited amounts of commercial activity without loss of
exemption so long as it used the revenues for charitable purposes. Id. at 669. The enactment
of the UBIT and feeder organization provisions of the tax code in 1950 repudiated the des-
tination of income test. Id. at 670; see also supra note 185 and accompanying text.
211. Columbo, supra note 87, at 688.
212. Id. at 689-90.
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ancillary joint ventures, and for the IRS to provide clearer stan-
dards or safe harbors so that application of the test will be more
predictable.
Unlike some of the more sweeping reforms above, my view of
the necessary change is more conservative. First, I argue that the
IRS needs to reform, but not eliminate, the control test. As dis-
cussed in Part II.B.1, the IRS uses the control test to presumptively,
if not dispositively, assess private benefit and relatedness. Part of
the problem is the ill-defined concept of private benefit.214 It can be
taken to mean something akin to private inurement, or more gen-
erally it can serve as a safeguard to ensure that an activity actually
serves the public in the way we expect charity should.2  Though
the Service has firmly established private benefit as an independ-
ent doctrine from private inurement,216 the concepts are related. In
fact, as the IRS has acknowledged, private inurement can be
viewed as a subset of private benefit.2 17 Private inurement applies
solely to insiders,28 and only with regard to improper economic
inurement in any amount.2 19 Private benefit, in contrast, can be
found where any non-incidental benefit, economic or other, ac-
crues to any person whether an insider or an unrelated third
party.22° Viewed in this way, private inurement is simply the worst
type of private benefit.
12 2
However, intermediate sanctions22 now serve as the primary po-
licing mechanism for private inurement. They permit the IRS to
impose the far less onerous penalty of monetary penalties for con-
213. See, e.g., Mirkay, supra note 39, at 60-67 (analyzing proposals made by Professor
John Columbo and Mr. Michael Sanders).
214. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
215. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) ("The term charitable is used in section
501(c) (3) in its generally accepted legal sense .... "); id. at (d)(1)(ii) (stating that an or-
ganization is not serving an exempt [charitable] purpose unless it serves a public interest).
216. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
217. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
218. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
219. See I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2006) (referring to "economic benefit"); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (c) (2) (referring to "net earnings").
220. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987).
221. Reasonable people might disagree about whether private inurement is the "worst"
type of private benefit or merely one particular type that is no better nor worse than any
other is. Even on the latter view, the point that the disparity in remedies-revocation on the
one hand and monetary penalties on the other-remains valid. However, strong arguments
are available to support the assertion that private inurement is worse. Aside from being ex-
plicitly forbidden by the statute, where private benefit is at most implied, private inurement
only occurs when insiders (who normally have influence over the operation of the organiza-
tion) receive inappropriate economic benefit. This implicates self-dealing and disloyalty.
Similarly, society will tolerate an insubstantial amount of private benefit, but any amount of




ferring excess benefits on "disqualified persons," rather than pro-
ceeding directly to revocation. Commentators disagree about the
desirability of using intermediate sanctions in the context of pri-
vate benefit.22 4 Nevertheless, if the worst type of private benefit
should rarely trigger revocation, it makes no sense that a lesser
type would. Therefore, whether the correct approach is imposition
of an excise tax or, as Professor Mirkay suggests, higher rates of
225UBIT or forced divestiture, the disparity in remedies must be re-
solved.26
Reducing the likelihood of revocation under the private benefit
doctrine would do much to eliminate the disproportionate risk of
engaging in direct joint ventures. But this alone does not provide a
suitable framework for analyzing a given joint venture or the ag-
gregate joint venture activity in which a non-profit engages. When
the IRS polices improper private benefit in its "superset of inure-
ment" guise, it is not only sensible, but also necessary to engage in
the per-transaction analysis it has espoused in GCM 39,598 and in
various litigating positions. However, when policing private benefit
in its "charity is activity for the public good" guise, the per-
transaction approach fails. This is because the substantiality
223. Commentators generally agree, and the legislative record suggests, that revocation
should be very rare under the intermediate sanctions regime. John D. Columbo, Private
Benefit, Joint Ventures, and the Death of Healthcare as an Exempt Purpose, 34J. HEALTH L. 505, 514
n.55 (2001).
224. Compare Mirkay, supra note 39, at 70-87 (favoring such a change), with Jill S.
Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 FORD-AM L. REv.
735, 752-62 (2007) (opposing such a change). Professor Manny believes that unlike private
benefit, private inurement is subject to a "hair-trigger" that perhaps justifies intermediate
sanctions in the latter but not the former. Id. at 746. This may be true in the sense that the
IRS tolerates an incidental amount of private benefit. However, I would argue that at a
higher level of abstraction, under the intermediate sanctions regime the hair-trigger argu-
ment actually works in the other direction. A single transaction that violates the prohibition
against private inurement will result in excise tax, but a single transaction that violates the
prohibition against private benefit will-if we take the IRS at face value-result in revoca-
tion. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987).
225. Mirkay, supra note 39, at 70-71.
226. Unfortunately, recent amendments make it abundantly clear that the Service con-
tinues to view private benefit as necessitating revocation even where private inurement has
been present and can be remedied through the imposition of excise taxes. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501 (c) (3)-l (f) (2) (i) ("Regardless of whether a particular transaction is subject to excise
taxes under section 4958, the substantive requirements for tax exemption under section
501 (c) (3) still apply .... Accordingly, an organization will no longer meet the requirements
for tax-exempt status under section 501 (c) (3) if the organization fails to satisfy the require-
ments of paragraph (b), (c), or (d) of this section."). Incomprehensibly, though, the very
next clause specifies that private inurement violations will be evaluated on a facts and
circumstances basis to determine whether revocation should result. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501 (c) (3)-l (f) (2) (ii).
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element of the operational test,2 7 augmented by the UBIT provi-
sions that explicitly permit an exempt organization to engage in an
unrelated trade or business if it is willing to be taxed on it,228 make
it clear that an exempt organization can engage in a limited
amount of activities that confer no public benefit at all. 9 Only in
the aggregate, when such activity becomes more than insubstantial,
should the organization's exempt status be implicated. Thus, on
one hand, revocation is an improper remedy when policing private
benefit in the "superset of inurement" guise. However, on the
other hand, revocation is an entirely appropriate remedy for an
exempt organization that engages primarily in activities not related
to or furthering its exempt purposes.
As the foregoing analysis shows, the current IRS approach to as-
sessing remedies for problematic joint ventures is flawed and
should be reformed. However, clarifying the distinction between
the different guises of private benefit, and handling violations ac-
cordingly and consistently with the treatment of private inurement,
does not entirely solve the problem. The Service must also review
its approach to determining whether a given joint venture is prob-
lematic in the first place. Understanding the dual roles of private
benefit helps to reveal the proper application of the control test in
detecting a violation. Control of a particular joint venture may be
directly relevant to the issue of private benefit in its "superset of
inurement" guise. To that end, the IRS should continue to evaluate
control on a per-transaction basis, but without an automatic pen-
alty of revocation for failure.
But when the issue is private benefit in its "charity is activity for
the public good guise," control tells us much less. After all, a given
joint venture itself need not be charitable, so long as its activities
are either insubstantial or they further the hospital's exempt pur-
poses. Control of such a venture, in itself, would be irrelevant. Yet a
control test still may have value in this guise. It may aid the analysis
of relatedness of a particular joint venture for UBIT purposes.
Similarly, control of individual joint ventures is relevant to the
question of whether, in the aggregate, the organization continues
to operate for charitable purposes. Because these distinctions are
subtle and complicated, it is all the more important that a court
considering the tax liability and exemption consequences of ajoint
227. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (c), (e); see supra Part I.B.2.
228. I.R.C. §§ 511-514 (2006); see supra Part II.B.2.
229. It could be argued, particularly in light of the repudiation of the destination of in-
come test, that such an operation generates nothing but private benefit, even if engaged in
directly by the exempt organization without the use of a for-profit partnership.
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venture engage in a structured and rigorous evaluation of each is-
sue.
In each application of the test, control should be a factor rather
than an outcome-determinative conclusion. The IRS polices pri-
vate benefit, substantiality, and relatedness, and engages-or
purports to engage-in a "facts and circumstances" evaluation. °
After exhaustively reviewing articles of organization, management
contracts, and the like, there is simply no need to arrive at an in-
termediate conclusion that pre-determines the holding. With such
an intensive review already under way, a per se rule fails to serve the
objectives of administrative or judicial economy. A dispositive in-
termediate conclusion is also inappropriate since joint ventures are
evaluated to determine their impact on the non-profit's ability to
satisfy the operational test.2 31 The entire point of having an opera-
tional test is to review what an organization actually does as
opposed to what it says it will do; in this context, ignoring other
evidence in favor of a single structural conclusion is irrational.232
Use of control as a factor rather than as a conclusion restores the
proper focus of the evaluation without imposing new, additional
costs.
Finally, as others have already urged,233 the IRS should provide
meaningful guidance to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding
critical terms like "in furtherance of," "insubstantial," and "substan-
tially related." Granted, this is no easy task. However, since joint
ventures are becoming increasingly critical to hospitals' survival,2 4
forcing them to risk their exemption by guessing incorrectly
235
about the consequences evades responsibility, and instead of deter-
ring problematic joint ventures may simply channel them into less
230. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
231. The joint venture itself will be a for-profit entity and not subject to the organiza-
tional and operational tests. The non-profit has presumably already satisfied the
organizational test, and it is hard to imagine why it would amend its own constitutive docu-
ments in a manner that no longer satisfies the organizational test.
232. A reasonable counter-argument might be made that by virtue of creating the joint
venture the non-profit has engaged in activities reviewable under the operational test. But
while this argument does justify taking control into account in assessing the manner in
which the venture is operated, it fails to show why the Service or a court should ignore other
factors such as the actual work the venture does.
233. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
234. See supra Part IA.2.
235. This is not sarcasm; the combination of unclear standards, individual transaction
review under a per se test, and a moratorium on private letter rulings virtually dictates that
the exemption and UBIT effect of any given joint venture will have to be guessed at. See
supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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risky structures with potentially adverse consequences for the pub-
lic.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that joint ventures, previously prohibited,
have become an important and increasingly necessary mode of
modern health care operation. As their use has expanded to sig-
nificant proportions, IRS oversight has centered on a confusing
and inconsistently applied set of tests and doctrines, with the result
that direct joint ventures now carry significant risks that hospitals
can only partially alleviate. In contrast, the subsidiary joint venture
model eliminates these risks and presents several business incen-
tives. Furthermore, its principal drawback of guaranteed taxation
may be a worthwhile price to pay, particularly since direct joint
ventures may also be subject to tax liability. Since such subsidiaries
are not bound to operate in furtherance of their non-profit par-
ent's exempt purposes, the net result of a shift toward their use is
likely to be less overall community benefit. Ultimately, the inflexi-
ble application of a policy meant to preserve the integrity of the
charitable exemption system may reduce overall charitable activity.
Nevertheless, by employing a more analytically rigorous approach
to the problem, using existing enforcement tools, and providing
improved prospective guidance, the IRS could eliminate this dis-
torting effect without compromising the valid goal of deterring
abuse.
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